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IN THE SUPREME COURT OF THE STATE OF UTAH

STATE OF UTAH,

:

Plaintiff-Appellee,

:

v.

:

STEVEN RAY JAMES,

I

Case No. 890309

Category No. 2

Defendant-Appellant. :

BRIEF OF APPELLEE
JURISDICTION AND NATURE OF PROCEEDINGS
This appeal is from a conviction of criminal homicide,
murder in the first degree, a capital felony, in violation of
Utah Code Ann. § 76-5-202 (1990).

This Court has jurisdiction to

hear the appeal under Utah Code Ann. § 78-2-2(3)(i) (Supp. 1990)
because the appeal is from a district court in a criminal case
involving a capital felony.
STATEMENT OF ISSUES PRESENTED AND STANDARDS OF REVIEW
1.

Did the trial court violate defendant's rights to

due process, counsel, and a fair and impartial jury by the way in
which it conducted jury voir dire?

Trial judges have broad

discretion in conducting voir dire and their decisions will not
be overturned barring an abuse of discretion which rises to the
level of reversible error.

Utah R. Crim. P. 18(b) (1990); State

v. Bishop, 753 P.2d 439, 448 (Utah 1988).

Appellate courts will

presume that discretion was properly exercised by the trial court

unless the record clearly shows the contrary.

Goddard v.

Hickman, 685 P.2d 530, 534-35 (Utah 1984).
2.

Is the aggravating circumstance found in Utah Code

Ann. § 76-5-202(1)(h) limited to Utah convictions only for
felonies involving violence; alternatively, does that section
violate due process?

The trial court's legal conclusion that the

statute is constitutional and was applicable to this case is
reviewed under a correction of error standard.

City of

Monticello v. Christensen, 788 P.2d 513, 516 (Utah), cert.
denied, 111 S.Ct. 120 (1990).

Statutes are endowed with a

"strong presumption of validity and will not be declared
unconstitutional unless there is no reasonable basis upon which
they can be construed as conforming to constitutional
requirements."

In re Criminal Investigation, 7th Dist. Ct., 754

P.2d 633, 640 (Utah 1988).
3.

Did the trial court err in denying defendant's

motion for judgment notwithstanding the verdict or his motion to
be sentenced under the next lower category on the basis that the
evidence did not support a finding of the requisite culpable
mental state?

Both of these issues are matters of discretion

with the trial court; consequently, they should be reviewed under
an abuse of discretion standard.
1133, 1135 (Utah 1989).

State v. Gibbons, 779 P.2d

This issue is predicated on a review of

the jury's determination that defendant had the requisite mental
state to support conviction for first degree murder.

That

determination is to be accorded the deference due a jury finding
and this "Court should only interfere when . . . reasonable men

could not possibly have reached a verdict beyond a reasonable
doubt."

State v. Lamm, 606 P.2d 229, 231 (Utah 1980).
4.

Did defendant preserve for appeal his claim that he

was denied his right to counsel and access to the courts on the
basis that he was denied access to his counsel while in the Salt
Lake County Jail?

It is defendant's obligation to timely and

specifically object to claims of error at trial in order to
preserve the issue for appeal, and this Court will not address an
issue for the first time on appeal.
1141, 1144 (Utah 1989).

State v. Johnson, 774 P.2d

It is also defendant's obligation to

provide an adequate record supporting allegations of error.

If

he fails to do so, this Court "simply cannot rule on a question
which depends for its existence upon alleged facts unsupported by
the record."

State v. Wulffenstein, 657 P.2d 289, 293 (Utah

1982), cert, denied, 460 U.S. 1044 (1983).
5.

Did the court err in denying defendant's requested

jury instructions?

A trial court's decision to reject a proposed

jury instruction may either be a matter of discretion or a legal
conclusion.

Discretionary matters are reviewed under an abuse of

discretion standard.
1989).

State v. Gibbons, 779 P.2d 1133, 1135 (Utah

Legal conclusions are reviewed under a correction of

error standard.

City of Monticello v. Christensen, 788 P.2d 513,

516 (Utah), cert, denied, 111 S.Ct. 120 (1990).
6.

Did the court err in denying defendant's motion for

new trial on the basis of newly discovered evidence?

"[T]he

decision to grant or deny a new trial is a matter of discretion
with the trial court and will not be reversed absent a clear

abuse of that discretion."

State v. Williams, 712 P.2d 220, 222

(Utah 1985); see also State v. Beach, 661 P.2d 961, 961 (Utah
1983).
CONSTITUTIONAL PROVISIONS, STATUTES AND RULES
The language of the provisions upon which the State
relies are included in the body of this brief.
STATEMENT OF THE CASE
On October 23, 1986, defendant, Steven Ray James, was
charged with criminal homicide, murder in the first degree, a
capital felony, in violation of Utah Code Ann. § 76-5-202 (1990)
(Record [hereafter R.] at 1A).

On May 6, 1987, defendant filed a

motion for change of venue (R. at 127). When that motion was
denied (R. at 605), defendant took an interlocutory appeal and
this Court ordered that the trial be moved (R. at 681-87).
Upon the stipulation of the parties, the trial was
moved to the Third Judicial District Court in Salt Lake County on
April 26, 1989 (R. at 703-705).

The matter came on for jury

trial in the Third Judicial District Court for Salt Lake County,
the Honorable Pat B. Brian, district judge, presiding (R. at
718).

Trial was held May 1-4 and 8-11, 1989, and defendant was

found guilty as charged (R. at 718-25 and 1036).

On May 15,

1989, the jury heard evidence regarding an aggravating
circumstance and found by special verdict that defendant had
previously been convicted of a felony involving the use or threat
of violence to a person (R. at 1045 and transcript of phase II of
the trial, May 15, 1989).

On May 17, 1989, defendant filed a motion to record his
conviction as the next lower category of offense, and a motion
for judgment notwithstanding the verdict (R. at 1046-49).

At the

sentencing hearing held that day, the court denied both motions
and sentenced defendant to life in prison (R. at 1236 and
transcript of sentencing hearing, May 17, 1989)•
Defendant filed a motion for new trial on May 26, 1989,
alleging that one of the jurors did not believe that defendant
had intentionally killed the child, and that newly discovered
evidence about the door lock on defendant's car necessitated a
new trial (R. at 1240-41).

On May 30, 1989, defendant moved to

amend the new trial motion to add the allegation that his due
process rights were violated because the prosecutors did not have
authority to prosecute him (R. at 1252-53)•

The court conducted

a hearing on the motion and amended motion and denied them on
August 7, 1989 (R. at 1326-31).
Although nothing appears in the pleadings file to
indicate that defendant filed another motion for new trial,
supplemental transcripts for hearings conducted April 5 and 17,
1990, indicate that there was a second motion (Transcript of
proceedings, April 5, 1990 and April 17, 1990).

That motion was

based on allegations that a witness was found who would
corroborate defendant's testimony that he had never admitted
killing the child to an inmate in the Cache County Jail
(Transcript of April 5, 1990 at 2). The court denied that second
motion for new trial on April 17, 1990 (Transcript of April 17,
1990 at 16).

STATEMENT OF THE FACTS
In January of 1985, Victoria DeLeon met defendant at
their work in Hyrum, Utah (R. 1351 at 302 and R. 1355 at 977). 1
They moved in together in Logan, Utah approximately February 15
or 22, 1985 (R. 1351 at 303 and R. 1355 at 978). They
subsequently moved to Preston, Idaho and lived for a year in a
home owned by Don Lawhan (R. 1351 at 303-304).

On May 22, 1986,

a baby, Steven Roy James, was born to them (R. 1351 at 304-306
and R. 1355 at 979). After three weeks at home with the baby,
Victoria returned to work (R. 1351 at 305). Defendant was mostly
unemployed during the three months from the child's birth until
its disappearance on August 26, 1986 (R. 1351 at 308). The baby
tending duties basically fell to defendant (R. 1351 at 337 and R.
1355 at 1050).

Because defendant was not steadily employed and

because of the attendant financial pressures, the family moved
back to Logan, Utah on August 15, 1986 (R. 1351 at 304).
During the three months of the baby's life, Victoria
became concerned and complained to defendant about the way he
cared for the child (R. 1351 at 309, 319 and R. 1355 at 984).
When the baby was a few days old, just out of the hospital, he
did not sleep well at night.

One morning, the child was crying

and defendant took him out into the garage.

Victoria could still

hear the baby's crying and went out to see what was wrong.

The

baby had only a light blanket on and it was too cold outside for

The volumes of the trial transcript have been given record
numbers successive to the pleadings files. Those numbers, with
the individual page numbers from the transcripts, will be used in
citations to the trial transcripts.

him.

After that, when the baby tried to yawn, he would start to

cry because his mouth would not open correctly (R. 1351 at 31213).
When the child was about five weeks old, Victoria came
home from work one day and found defendant dressing the baby
after a bath.

The baby's skin was yellow, saliva was coming from

his mouth, he wasn't breathing well, and his skin was cold to the
touch.

Victoria asked defendant if he had given the baby a cold

bath; defendant replied that he had just put the child under the
tap.

Victoria told defendant that she was going to take the

child to the doctor but defendant told her that she worried too
much.

At defendant's suggestion, Victoria put the child in warm

water and in blankets, and the child finally returned to normal
(R. 1351 at 310-11).
When the baby was approximately two months old,
Victoria returned from work and found defendant with the child in
his arms.

The child was trying to cry but could not breathe.

When asked what had happened, defendant said that the child had
fallen out of his arms when defendant was trying to open a can
(R. 1351 at 312).
After the family moved to Logan, and about a week
before the child disappeared, Victoria returned from work and
found the baby in its carrier sitting on the living room floor.
Defendant, who was sitting next to the baby, told Victoria that
the baby had fallen off of the seat in the car.

When Victoria

tried to pick up the baby, he cried in pain (R. 1351 at 314).
Victoria saw that the baby had a blue bruise on its kneecap (R.

1351 at 320). Victoria told defendant that they should take him
to the doctor to check him.

Defendant said that he already had

taken the baby to the doctor, who had taken eight or nine x-rays,
and said that the baby was fine (R. 1351 at 314). The baby's
doctor testified that he had no record that the child was ever
brought in for x-rays (R. 1356 at 1207-1208; see also R. 1356 at
1249).

Defendant became angry when Victoria continued to cry and

worry about the infant (R. 1351 at 314-15).
A few days after the occurrence in the car, Victoria
found a bruise on the baby's forehead.
door had hit the baby.

Defendant said that the

Victoria became angry and again accused

defendant of not taking good care of the child; defendant told
her that she worried for nothing (R. 1351 at 321).
Another time when the child was one-and-a-half to two
months old, Victoria returned from work and found that the baby
had a red mark on its lip (R. 1351 at 317-18).

On another

occasion, Victoria found red finger marks on the baby's ribs and
red marks on the baby's neck.

She told defendant that he had to

be more careful when he picked up the baby.

Defendant said that

the marks on the neck were from the baby's shirt.

Victoria told

him that she did not want to see marks on the baby again;
defendant said that he would be more careful (R. 1351 at 318-20).
Every time Victoria expressed concern about the baby,
defendant accused her of only caring for the child.

Victoria

accused him of being jealous of the baby (R. 1351 at 322-23).
Defendant's unemployment and the attendant money problems caused
dissension between Victoria and defendant.

Defendant became

angry when his motorcycle was repossessed because Victoria would
not make the payments for it (R. 1351 at 332-34).

Defendant also

became angry when the baby was colicky and crying (R. 1351 at 334
and R. 1352 at 353-55).

Victoria and defendant obtained a

heating pad for the baby to help with the colic.

One night the

baby began crying and defendant got up to check it.

When

Victoria awoke later, the baby was still crying; Victoria found
that defendant had turned the heating pad on high and the baby
was sweating (R. 1352 at 353-55).
When Victoria returned to work after the baby was born,
she worked Monday through Friday.

Each morning, she would rise,

get ready for work, then feed the baby and sit with him for
awhile until her ride arrived at 5:20 a.m. (R. 1351 at 340-41).
On August 26, 1986, defendant got up early as well (R. 1355 at
989).

While he had sometimes gotten up early with Victoria, this

morning was different because defendant told her to stay with the
baby and he would watch for her ride (R. 1351 at 341). When
Victoria left for work, the baby was wearing a white undershirt
and a disposable diaper (R. 1351 at 342).
That afternoon, before 2:00 p.m., a police officer
approached her at work and told her that her baby was missing (R.
1351 at 306-307).

The officer took her to the police station

where she approached defendant and asked him where the baby was.
Defendant answered, "I am sorry.
(R. 1352 at 363-64).

I didn't do it on purpose."

Defendant told her that he had left the

baby in their car when he went in to Osco Drug in Logan; when he
returned in ten minutes, the baby was gone (R. 1352 at 364-66).

Victoria provided the baby's birth certificate, with his
footprints on it, a father's card with the baby's handprints, and
photographs of the baby to the police to help find the child (R.
1351 at 318 and R. 1352 at 358-59).

Defendant told her not to

give these things to the police and became angry with her when
she handed them over to the authorities (R. 1352 at 361-62).
On the evening of August 26, defendant gave the police
a description of the baby.

He told them that the baby was

wearing a solid blue t-shirt, a disposable diaper, and was
wrapped in a multicolored, striped, receiving blanket (R. 1353 at
610).

Defendant told police that he and the baby had gone back

to sleep after Victoria left and the baby awoke again about 8:00
or 8:30 a.m.

At about 9:00 a.m., the baby was still awake and

defendant put him on the couch in the living room while defendant
fixed water damage in the shower (R. 1353 at 612). Defendant ran
out of DAP, a putty used to repair showers, and decided to go to
Valley Discount, a store in Logan (R. 1353 at 613 and 616). At
this time, about 10:30 a.m., the baby was asleep, so defendant
left the child and their dog at home while he went to the store
(R. 1353 at 613-14).

Defendant returned around noon and found

the baby still asleep.

Defendant cleaned himself up, changed

clothes, and decided to run other errands (R. 1353 at 615-16).
By this time, the baby had awakened and defendant fed
and changed him (R. 1353 at 615). At 12:40-12:45 p.m., defendant
started the family Cadillac to allow it to warm up.

After five

minutes, he picked up the baby, got the dog (a toy poodle named
Rambo), and placed the baby in its carrier in the passenger side

of the front seat (R. 1353 at 614 and 616-17).

Defendant drove

to the parking lot of Osco Drug but could find no shade there to
park the car in.

Defendant pulled to the west side of the store

under some trees, rolled the windows down about six inches, and
went into Osco Drug (R. 1353 at 617-18).

Defendant said that he

left the doors unlocked (R. 1353 at 618).
Defendant found the DAP and purchased it.

He came out

of the store, walked to the car and opened the driver's door, at
which time he noticed that the baby was gone.

He ran to the pay

phone at Osco Drug and telephoned the Logan City Police (R. 1353
at 618).
Officer Mike Vaughan of the Logan City Police was the
first to respond to the scene, arriving at 12:57 p.m. (R. 1352 at
472-74).

At Officer Vaughan's questioning, defendant said that

he had locked the doors of the car but that the windows were down
for ventilation.

At that point, defendant reached through the

open window of the passenger door and unlocked that door.

Inside

was the small white poodle; a baby car seat on the front seat of
the car, facing the driver's side; and a baby bottle (R. 1352 at
475 and 481). After the door was unlocked, the officer opened
it.

The dog, who had been running around the car as defendant

and Officer Vaughan approached, immediately jumped out of the car
(R. 1352 at 475). The officer looked around the interior of the
car for the child, then, not seeing it, stepped back from the car
and closed the door (R. 1352 at 476). He asked defendant if
anything else was missing, and defendant responded that there was
nothing else (R. 1352 at 477).

Detective Kevin Christensen arrived at 1:10 p.m. and
began taking photographs and helping to process the vehicle for
fingerprints (R. 1353 at 704-705).

He was able to enter through

the passenger door which had been unlocked earlier.

He had to

lean through the car from the passenger side and unlock the
driver's door in order to enter that side of the car (R. 1353 at
706).

The driver's side window was opened one to two inches when

the officers arrived (R. 1353 at 711-12).

The officers were

unable to identify any of the prints taken from the vehicle (R.
1354 at 857).
Investigation by law enforcement disclosed that
defendant's purchase at Osco Drug was completed at 12:46 p.m. and
the call to the police was received at 12:54 p.m. (R. 1352 at 539
and 457).

Patricia Parker was behind defendant in the checkstand

at Osco Drug; she remembered that he paid for his purchase in
quarters and "became agitated, became nervous, anxious" when he
was a dime short (R. 1352 at 545-46).

Mrs. Parker's husband, a

uniformed peace officer, was with her at the time.

Defendant

never approached the officer when defendant sought to report his
child missing (R. 1352 at 550-53).
The police were able to find witnesses who had been in
the area of Osco Drug during the relevant time frame (R. 1353 at
570-605).

One woman had parked at a curb near Osco Drug, under

the trees, had entered the store, and made several purchases. No
other cars were parked there when she arrived.

When she left the

store about forty minutes later, she noticed defendant's car
parked in front of, and "very close," to hers (R. 1353 at 572-

76).

She started her car and sat there for a few minutes to

allow the air conditioner to cool the car.

During that time, she

did not see anyone around defendant's car (R. 1353 at 576-77).
"It was so terribly hot that day that most people were smart
enough to stay out of it."

(R. 1353 at 577). Another woman

recalled driving past that area at 12:52 p.m. on August 26 and
noticing nothing unusual (R. 1353 at 581-82 and 586).

A third

woman was driving back to work after lunch and saw defendant's
car at about 12:52 p.m. at Osco Drug.

She also saw a man about

defendant's height walking toward the store (R. 1353 at 588-93).
Marthan Ferguson was driving near Osco Dr:ug at 12:30 to
12:45 p.m. on August 26.

She saw defendant's car parked at the

curb near the store (R. 1353 at 594-95).

She was stopped at a

stop sign, waiting to cross 500 North, when she saw a girl with
long blond hair approach defendant's car (R. 1353 at 596-97).
The girl got out of a car parked across the street from
defendant's car, walked across the street and tried to open the
driver's door of defendant's Cadillac (R. 1353 at 597-99).
door apparently was locked (R. 1353 at 598).

The

Mrs. Ferguson could

see defendant's poodle running back and forth across the front
seat; she assumed the girl was trying to let the dog out because
of the heat that day (R. 1353 at 597-98 and 605). Mrs. Ferguson
finally drove through the intersection, but then had to stop to
avoid hitting the girl who was returning to her own car.

The

girl's car was running and Mrs. Ferguson waited until the girl
drove away before proceeding on her way (R. 1353 at 600). Mrs.
Ferguson did not get close enough to defendant's car to see if

there was a baby inside; however, if there was a baby, the dog
was running over it (R. 1353 at 601).
Carol Comins lived upstairs from defendant and Victoria
in Logan (R. 1352 at 443). She heard the baby crying between
9:00 and 10:00 a.m. the morning of August 26 (R. 1352 at 444).
She left for a doctor's appointment; when she returned at 11:00
a.m., defendant's car was gone (R. 1352 at 445). Mrs. Comins did
not hear the baby again after 11:00 a.m. (R. 1352 at 454).
On October 7, 1986, George Blummer was duck hunting in
an area west of Logan, called the Valley View marina (R. 1353 at
716).

He saw a bundle in the water near his canoe, approximately

eight to ten feet from shore (R. 1353 at 716-17).

He picked it

up and saw that it was some kind of blanket material, wrapped in
an electrical cord (R. 1353 at 717-18).

Mr. Blummer opened one

end of the bundle and a rock fell out; he looked inside the
bundle, saw "some fleshy type of material," and put the bundle
back in the water (R. 1353 at 718-19).

Mr. Blummer thought that

the bundle contained an unwanted litter of dogs or cats (R. 1353
at 725-26).

The bundle weighed approximately twenty-five pounds

and was three feet by one-and-a-half to two feet, and was in
water two-and-a-half feet deep (R. 1353 at 719-721).
2
On October 11, 1986, Arthur Flandro was at the Valley
View marina on the Bear River, duck hunting (R. 1353 at 727-28).
At about 11:45 a.m., he noticed a bundle about three feet from
shore, in about a foot-and-a-half of water (R. 1353 at 728). Mr.
2
The transcript indicates that Arthur L. Flanders was called as
a witness; however, the witness gave his name as Flandro. The
State will use that spelling of his name.

Flandro moved the material in the bundle and realized that the
bundle contained human remains. He told another person there to
secure the area from dogs or other people.

Mr. Flandro then ran

up to the highway, flagged down a motorist, and asked him to
notify authorities in town (R. 1353 at 729-30).

The police

arrived in fifteen to twenty minutes (R. 1353 at 730). Officers
with scuba training searched the river bottom and retrieved the
bundle with the body in it, and other human bones which had
escaped from the bundle (R. 1353 at 738-43).
The bundle and bones were taken to the medical
examiner's office (R. 1353 at 753-55).

The bundle was made up of

a padded cloth material, tied with an electrical cord, five
stones, a receiving blanket, and a baby's body dressed in a blue
t-shirt and a disposable diaper (R. 1353 at 752 and 756-58).

The

medical examiner found extensive decomposition and was unable to
determine the cause of death (R. 1354 at 782-90).

He was able to

rule out beating, shooting, stabbing, and cutting as causes of
death; he could not rule out death by suffocation, drowning,
shaking, strangulation, or SIDS (sudden infant death syndrome)
(R. 1354 at 789-90 and 796-97).

The examiner did determine that

the manner of death was homicide because of the way that the body
was disposed of (R. 1354 at 788). Using the newborn footprints
and father's day card handprint supplied by Victoria, the
officials were able to identify the body as that of Steven Roy
James (R. 1354 at 793 and 804-12).
The cloth in which the body was wrapped was identified
by Don Lawhan, the owner of the home in Preston in which

defendant and Victoria had been living.

Mr. Lawhan had been a

maintenance worker in Preston, working on smoke and fire damaged
buildings.

As part of that work, he used mattress covers as drop

clothes; he had given defendant permission to use the mattress
covers when defendant and Victoria moved to Logan (R. 1354 at
841-44).

He identified the cloth in which the baby's body was

wrapped as a cloth he had used to cover furniture while painting.
He specifically remembered a hole in the cloth as one he had to
be careful of when he used the cloth (R. 1354 at 844-45).
Victoria also identified the mattress cover, or drop cloth, as
one used by defendant in moving their belongings to Logan.

After

the move, the cloth was put with other things in a back room of
defendant's Logan apartment (R. 1357 at 1293-94).
Defendant was arrested and charged with murdering his
child (R. at 1A and 18).

While he was being held in the Cache

County Jail he was housed, at one point, with several other
inmates (R. 1356 at 1140).

One inmate, Ronald Peterson,

testified that he heard defendant speaking to another inmate, Jon
Lippencott (R. 1355 at 922). Defendant told Lippencott that he
had killed the baby; defendant had been out to the marina the day
before the baby disappeared (R. 1355 at 923). Peterson told law
enforcement about this conversation, hoping to get a better deal
on his case.

The State never made a deal with him (R. 1355 at

929 and 931).
SUMMARY OF THE ARGUMENT
The trial court has considerable latitude as to the
manner in which it conducts voir dire.

The court does not abuse
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The trial court did

not abuse its discretion by denying defendant's motion for arrest
of judgment and motion for sentencing under the next lower
category of offense.

In order to grant either motion on the

grounds advanced by defendant, the court would have had to
determine that no reasonable person could have found defendant
guilty beyond a reasonable doubt.

Defendant did not establish in

the trial court, and does not establish before this Court, that
the evidence was so inconclusive or insubstantial on the issue of
intent or knowledge that reasonable minds must have entertained a
reasonable doubt.
Defendant has not preserved for appeal the claim that
he was denied access to his counsel during trial.

The record is

devoid of any indication that defendant brought this issue to the
attention of the trial court until after the jury had retired for
deliberations.

Because defendant either failed to raise a timely

objection or failed to make a timely record of his objection,
this Court should not rule on this issue.
The trial court did not abuse its discretion by
rejecting defendant's proposed "reasonable alternative
hypothesis" instructions.

The trial court adequately instructed

the jury as to the prosecution's burden of proof; consequently,
it was not an abuse of discretion to reject the proposed
instructions.
The trial court also did not abuse its discretion when
it denied defendant's two motions for new trial based on newly
discovered evidence.

The trial court found that the evidence

could have been discovered before trial and was merely
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dire of the venire individually, and more extensive questioning
ol tin •,'" panel.
The conduct of jury voi r dire is governed by rul e
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uLaii Ruxes of Criminal Procedure (1 990),

which reads:

The court may permit counsel or tl le
defendant to conduct the examination of the
prospective jurors or may itself conduct the
examination. In the latter event, the courtmay permit counsel or the defendant to
supplement the examinati on. by siicl i further
inquiry as it deems proper, or may itself
submit to the prospective jurors additional
questions requested by counsel oi: the
defendant.
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W h i l e there m a y

.be d e b a t e in the legal journals about the advisability of

different methods of voir dire, the appellate courts of this
state have not dictated any specific method to be used by the
trial courts.
The latitude afforded trial courts was reaffirmed by
this Court in State v. Moton, 749 P.2d 639 (Utah 1988), when it
said:
The trial court has traditionally been given
considerable latitude as to the manner and
the form of conducting the voir dire
examination and is only restricted in that
discretion from committing prejudicial error.
Id. at 643 (citing Utah State Road Commission v. Marriott, 21
Utah 2d 238, 444 P.2d 57 (1968)).

That discretion extends to

"seating fair, impartial jurors" in the context of defendant's
constitutional right to a fair trial by impartial jurors.
v. Bishop, 753 P.2d 439, 448 (Utah 1988).

State

In Bishop, this Court

defined the purpose of voir dire:
Voir dire provides the means for detecting
juror prejudice or bias, thereby enabling
counsel to intelligently challenge such
persons. Accordingly, sufficient latitude in
the questioning process must be given to
preserve the right to a fair trial. It
follows that whether the trial court abused
its discretion in conducting voir dire turns
on whether, considering the totality of the
questioning, counsel was afforded an adequate
opportunity to gain the information necessary
to evaluate jurors.
On appeal, an appellant has the burden of
establishing that reversible error resulted
from an abuse of discretion.
Id, at 448 (footnotes omitted).

This Court has also determined

that questions asked by the trial court which are similar to
those requested by a defendant suffice to refute a defendant's
claim of prejudice.
1988).

State v. Lafferty, 749 P.2d 1239, 1252 (Utah
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First, as we have repeatedly stated, "A
general rule of appellate review in criminal
cases in Utah is that a contemporaneous
objection or some form of specific
preservation of claims of error must be made
a part of the trial court record before an
appellate court wi 11 review such clai m on
appeal." Importantly, the grounds for the
objection must be distinctly and specifically
stated. Here, although defendant made '
general motion . . ., the grounds he now
raises on appeal were not specifically or
distinctly stated to the court below. Thus,
under the standard noted, they were not
preserved for our review.

Oi i

a

State v. Johnson, 774 P.2d 1141, 1144 (Utah 1989) (quoting State
v, Tillman, 750 P. 2d 546, 551 (Utah 1987)) (emphasis in original)
(footnote omitted).

The Utah Court of Appeals applied this

premise to the subject of voir dire in Broberg v. Hess, 782 P.2d
198 (Utah Ct. App. 1989), in which it stated the general
proposition:
A timely and recorded objection to the
trial court's failure to comply with a
request at trial puts the judge on notice of
the asserted error and allows the opportunity
for correction at that time in the course of
the proceeding. A specific objection to the
failure to make a requested voir dire inquiry
is required so that the trial court may
correct its error before the jury is selected
and empaneled. There is no support for
appellant's claim that the trial judge knew
the action he was requested to take but
refused to take it.
Id. at 201.

See also State v. Worthen, 765 P.2d 839, 844 (Utah

1988) (record did not demonstrate that defendant was prevented
from asking proper questions; it is defendant's obligation to
provide a record which supports his contentions).
The record in the present case does not demonstrate
that defendant was prejudiced by the manner in which voir dire
was conducted.

Less than a month prior to trial, defendant filed

a motion for "individual, sequest[er]ed voir dire examination."
(R. at 1086-88).

That motion was based on defendant's concerns

about pretrial publicity, questions and answers about which might
taint the remaining panel, and the fact that the charge was
capital murder.

Defendant felt that prospective jurors would be

more candid and truthful if questioned individually.

Defendant

also asked that a juror questionnaire be disseminated in order to

"screen" the jurors.

Finally,, defendant r^qu^Fted tJIMt vcu i dire

be conducted hy f he attorneys.
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At the beginning of trial, the court called sixty
prospective jurors and began questioning them (R. 1350 at 4).
The jurors were questioned, inter alia, about their
acquaintanceship with counsel, defendant, witnesses, and anyone
in law enforcement; their prior jury experience; their experience
with crime, as victim or accused; and their media exposure to the
present case (R. 1350 at 6-10).

Of the sixty-nine (either

prospective jurors or alternates) who were eventually called and
questioned, twenty-five were excused for cause for reasons other
than having formed an opinion of defendant's guilt based on the
publicity (R. 1350 at 36, 64, 82, 84, 99, 103, 104, 105, 106,
107, 108, 110, 112, 136, 151, 154, 156, 158, and R. 1351 at 216,
221, 233, 240, 242, 248, and 253). Of those not excused for a
cause other than an opinion of defendant's guilt, nine had either
not heard of or had no memory of publicity about the case (R.
1350 at 43, 77, 80, 123-24, 141, 166, and 192, and R. 1351 at
227, and 250-51).

Seven others were excused for cause when they

indicated to the court that they had formed opinions as to
defendant's guilt or innocence on the basis of the publicity the
case had generated.

Each time a venireman indicated that he or

she may have formed an opinion about guilt, the court immediately
called the person to the bench and further questioning was
conducted outside the hearing of the rest of the panel (R. 1350
at 17-18, 24, 46, 114, 116, 145, and R. 1351 at 224). Those who
were left for counsel to exercise their peremptory challenges had
either received no publicity about the case, or had formed no
opinion about guilt based on the publicity.
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excused (R. 1350 at 188). Another bench conference with counsel
was held and further questions asked of the panel (R. 1350 at
188-90).

In chambers, defense counsel challenged for cause all

veniremen whom had indicated an exposure to publicity on the
"basis of the publicity."

Some other veniremen were challenged

on other grounds (R. 1350 at 196-202).

Defendant continued to

object to exercising his peremptory challenges; however, he never
proposed any further specific questions to be asked of the panel.
Before exercising his challenges on the second day of trial,
defendant filed an objection to the voir dire, generally stating
that he had been prejudiced by a "superficial" questioning of the
panel (R. at 938-43).

He asked that the court reopen voir dire

and permit attorney questioning of the panel, sequestered
questioning, and the posing of questions which had been
previously submitted by counsel (R. at 943). He did not specify
which additional questions he wanted asked of the panel.

The

court denied this request (R. 1351 at 215).
On appeal, defendant again objects to what he terms the
limiting of voir dire.

He does not indicate what specific

questions the court should have asked.

Neither does he

specifically indicate how additional questions would have helped
him in challenging prospective jurors. The trial court asked
each panel member whether he or she had seen the publicity
surrounding the case, and, if so, whether he or she had formed an
opinion about the case based on that publicity.

Defendant

appears to assume that those who answered in the negative may not
have been truthful, and that further unspecified questioning

won,Id have ferreted out the falsity.
questi II I-I'U i"

He does not indicate how

I r l ijwi j,if'i[,/(^i •Iwy reivl

•

,

'

" '

television station they I u ten t.o or wali.h wuuJd havt uncoveied
the deception

"II hose who

o p i n J o r i i l l 111 i 11. 111J«1111

IMII

i ! 11 mi II I I

Imnil of 1 he raue but t oririulated no
ni mi ni 11 11 I i

i

11 i mi i • 11

I 11

111I

u n d e r s t o o d and a c c e p t e d t h e c o n c e p t s oi p r e s u m p t i o n ol
ci

I I In

"ififp1

ihui'den of proof , o o u l d p r o p e r l y

Those peisoiib agreed

l.n l i s t e n

i an c l ml 1 \ In il In

a p p l y t h e law and d e c i d e t h e c a s e f a i r l y
quostiuiiLi askir- Il I | I \u
already

innocence

mi t h e

|in< •,

p oiJmn k din I I

impartially.

The*

t.ho m u r I e x c u s e d 1:1 lose p e r s o n s

from,

D e f e n d a n t was n o t d e n i e d h i s i::I gl it t o s e l e c t a

am: I :::i Iiii| t a i : L i ci I

fair

"iiii i i
POINT I I

U T A H C 0 D E mM^
§ 76.5.202(1)(h) WAS CORRECTLY
APPLIED A T DEFENDANT # S TRIAL. THAT
SUBSECTION IS NOT VOID FOR VAGUENESS, NEITHER
WAS ITS APPLICATION IN THIS CASE A VIOLATION
OF DEFENDANT' FTTH"" TO EQUAL PROTECTION.

Defi-^a - • beuuru
P"1*

c

.

alternatively

WAC5

that t rifl

HT

oi «xi
j

_

t

Ty

i «" that Utah Code

gnp

-:bse. : i -n :s

ij

Lin

hiiL

i ilbil

nallenged subse* ^ * A. . .

i

1.

• i for vagueness ar
otection.

'-> .

i I ni •-? Y

" i n I h i I T l y i ' e v eaLeci t h o s e who had

formed an o p i n i o n ;

the venire,

and

sit

i I ni i

t

Criminal homicide consti tutes murder in the
first degree if the actor intentionally or
knowingly causes the death of another under
any of the following circumstances:

(h) The actor was previously convicted of
first or second degree murder or of a
felony involving the use or threat of

violence to a person. For the purpose of
this paragraph an offense committed in
another jurisdiction, which if committed in
Utah would be punishable as first or second
degree murder, is deemed first or second
degree murder.
Utah Code Ann. § 76-5-202(1)(h) (1990).

Defendant argues,

without citing any legal authority, that the second sentence of
subsection (h) limits the use of felonies involving the use or
threat of violence to a person to Utah convictions.

This

construction belies the clear language of the statute.
A standard rule of statutory construction is "that a
statute, clear and unambiguous on its face, need not and cannot
be interpreted by a court."
§45.02 (4th ed. 1987).

Sutherland, Statutory Construction,

This Court has adopted that rule in State

v. Johnson, 12 Utah 2d 220, 364 P.2d 1019 (1961), wherein it
said:
We . . . conclude that the legislation
must be read in the light of its clear
language and import[.]
Id.

When this rule is applied to the present case, defendant's

argument is without merit.
Subsection (h) contains two sentences.

The first

plainly states that it is an aggravating circumstance for first
degree murder if the "actor was previously convicted of first or
second degree murder or of a felony involving the use or threat
of violence to a person."

No qualification is stated as to the

jurisdiction in which the murder or violent felony occurred.
According to the first sentence, any first or second degree
murder or violent felony serves as an aggravating circumstance.

The second sentence of subsection " I

does nut aiteet
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i n S t a t e v . P i l c h e r , 636 P.2d 4/(1 (Utah 19H1I)

- i ta i u L e

in w h i c h it said:

A statute JLB not unconstitutionally vague
if it is sufficiently explicit to inform the
ordinary reader what conduct is prohibited.
. . . The statute need only be as definite
and certain as the subject matter permits.

raised by the petitioners In Bouie v. City of Columbia/
347 (1964), in which the standard was set out as:

"The constitutional requirement of
definiteness is violated by a criminal
statute that fails to give a person of
ordinary intelligence fair notice that his
contemplated conduct is forbidden by the
statute. The underlying principle is that no
man shall be held criminally responsible for
conduct which he could not reasonably
understand to be proscribed."
378 U.S. at 351 (quoting United States v. Harriss, 347 U.S. 612f
617 (1954)).

The statute now challenged gave defendant fair

notice that a conviction of a felony involving the use or threat
of violence to a person can be used as an aggravating
circumstance for purposes of convicting him of murder in the
first degree.

The statute is not, as defendant alleges,

ambiguous as to the use of foreign felonies.

The statute

specifically states that felonies involving the use or threat of
violence to a person will be used for aggravating purposes.

The

language which clarifies the use of convictions of first or
second degree murder does not refer to convictions of other
violent felonies.

Since the second sentence of subsection (h)

does not refer to other violent felonies, it does not restrict
the use of convictions for those other felonies.

Consequently,

all other violent felonies, whether Utah or foreign, may be used
as aggravating circumstances.
Finally, defendant alleges that use of defendant's
California felony conviction violates his right to equal
protection of the law.

Defendant fails to cite any legal

authority to support this contention; consequently, this Court
should decline to address the issue.

See State v. Amicone, 689

P.2d 1341 (Utah 1984) ("Since the defendant fails to support this

argument by any legal analysis or authority, we decline to rule
on it").
Defendant argues that his conviction in California
would have been no more than a misdemeanor conviction for
unlawful detention in Utah; consequently, he argues, its use as
the aggravating circumstance of a violent felony conviction is a
violation of equal protection.

Defendant has never established,

either in the trial court or before this Court, that defendant's
crime would only have been a misdemeanor in Utah.

The amended

information to which defendant pled guilty charged him with false
imprisonment, a felony.

He was specifically charged with having

"wilfully, unlawfully and feloniously violate[d] the personal
liberty of Sharon Elizabeth Cates, effected by violence, menace
and force" (R. at 1141).

Defendant's sentence was suspended and

he was placed on probation for three years (R. at 1142-46).

Both

because the crime was termed a violent felony, and because of the
length of the probationary period, this crime was considered a
violent felony in California.

Given the definition of the crime

and the severity of the sentence, it would also be considered a
violent crime in Utah.

Defendant simply has not demonstrated how

the use of this California conviction violated his right to equal
protection of the law.
POINT III
THE TRIAL COURT DID NOT ERR WHEN IT DENIED
DEFENDANT'S MOTION FOR JUDGMENT
NOTWITHSTANDING THE VERDICT, AND HIS MOTION
FOR SENTENCING UNDER THE NEXT LOWER CATEGORY.
Defendant next claims that the trial court erred when
it denied his motion for judgment notwithstanding the verdict and

motion for sentencing under the next lower category.

Both

motions were based on defendant's claim that "there was no
substantial evidence of a killing or of an intentional or knowing
killing by defendant" (Brief of Appellant [hereafter Br. of App.]
at 26).
The denial of both motions are matters of discretion
with the trial court.

Citing decisions of this Court, the Utah

Court of Appeals recently stated:
The general rule concerning abuse of
discretion is that the appellate court "will
presume that the discretion of the trial
court was properly exercised unless the
record clearly shows the contrary." Goddard
v. Hickman, 685 P.2d 530, 534-35 (Utah 1984);
. . . An appellant has the burden of
establishing that reversible error resulted
from an abuse of discretion. State v.
Bishop, 753 P.2d 439, 448 (Utah 1988).
State v. Jonas, 793 P.2d 902, 906 (Utah Ct. App. 1990).
As will be addressed below, a motion for judgment
notwithstanding the verdict is a civil remedy; the analog in
criminal procedure is a motion to arrest judgment.

Although this

Court apparently has not set forth a specific abuse of discretion
standard for a motion to arrest judgment, it has analogized a
motion to arrest judgment to a motion for new trial.

This Court

has consistently declared that "the decision to grant or deny a
new trial is a matter of discretion with the trial court and will
not be reversed absent a clear abuse of that discretion."

State

v. Williams, 712 P.2d 220, 222 (Utah 1985); see also State v.
Beach, 661 P.2d 961 (Utah 1983).

Especially in a case such as

this where the basis for the arrest of judgment is a claim of
insufficient evidence, the trial court, as well as this Court,

should accord the jury verdict the deference reserved for
sufficiency claims.

See State v. Booker, 709 P.2d 342, 345 (Utah

1985); State v. Kerekes, 622 P.2d 1161, 1168 (Utah 1980).

As

this Court said in State v. Myers, 606 P.2d 250 (Utah 1980):
When there has been a trial by jury, the
state, as well as the defendant, is entitled
to the benefit of the findings and the
verdict of the jury. The trial judge can
intrude upon the prerogatives of the jury and
substitute his judgment therefor only if he
can so rule as a matter of law.
Id. at 251.

In a concurring opinion in Myers, Justice Wilkins

added:
An appellate court, or a trial court, is
not permitted in a civil or criminal action
to substitute its judgment for the jury's
unless the verdict is based on evidence that
is so inherently improbable that no
reasonable mind could believe it (and in a
criminal case a "not guilty" verdict cannot
be overturned whether a reasonable mind could
believe it or not).
In short, the legal mechanism of arresting
a judgment is a firmly entrenched exception
to the rule of law . . . that jurors are the
exclusive judges of the credibility of the
witnesses and the weight of the evidence.
Id. at 253 (footnote omitted).
As to defendant's motion for sentencing under the next
lower category, the applicable statute provides that a court
"may" enter a judgment of conviction for the next lower category
in certain circumstances.

Utah Code Ann. § 76-3-402 (1990).

As

this Court said in State v. Gibbons, 779 P.2d 1133 (Utah 1989):
An appellate court will set aside a sentence
imposed by the trial court if the sentence
represents an abuse of discretion, State v.
Gerrard, 584 P.2d 885, 887 (Utah 1978), if
the trial judge fails to consider all legally
relevant factors, State v. Holland, 777 P.2d
1019 (Utah 1989), or if the sentence imposed
exceeds the limits prescribed by law.

Id, at 1135.

Defendant does not allege that the sentence imposed

exceeded the limits prescribed by law or that the judge failed to
consider all legally relevant factors.

Consequently, this issue

should be reviewed under an abuse of discretion standard.
A.

Motion for Judgment Notwithstanding the
Verdict.

At the conclusion of the trial, after the jury had
convicted him, defendant filed a motion for judgment
notwithstanding the verdict (R. at 1048-49).

This motion did not

cite a procedural rule supporting it; however, a motion for
directed verdict and for judgment not withstanding the verdict is
authorized by rule 50, Utah Rules of Civil Procedure (1990).
However, the rules of civil procedure have applicability in
criminal proceedings only "where there is no other applicable
statute or rule[.]M

Utah R. Civ. P. 81(e).

The relief sought by

defendant in this motion is governed by rule 23, Utah Rules of
Criminal Procedure, which reads:
At any time prior to the imposition of
sentence, the court upon its own initiative
may, or upon motion of a defendant shall,
arrest judgment if the facts proved or
admitted do not constitute a public offense,
. . . or there is other good cause for the
arrest of judgment.
Defendant's motion should be treated and analyzed under rule 23.
Defendant's motion was based, inter alia, upon a claim
that the evidence did "not support a reasonable conclusion that
the Defendant either intentionally or knowingly caused the death
3
of his infant child" (R. at 1048).
On appeal, defendant claims
3
Defendant raised other bases in that motion but has not argued
them on appeal. Those bases should be considered abandoned.

that his motion should have been granted because there was
insufficient evidence that the child was killed or that defendant
intentionally or knowingly killed the child.

Whether the child

was killed was never raised below and should not be addressed for
the first time on appeal.

See State v. Johnson/ 774 P.2d 1141,

1144 (Utah 1989); State v. Tillman, 750 P.2d 546, 551 (Utah
1987).
The motion to arrest judgment is based entirely on a
claim of insufficient evidence. As noted above, in determining
whether to intrude upon the jury's verdict, the trial court can
do so "only if he can so rule as a matter of law."
P.2d 250-251 (Utah 1980).

Myers, 606

This Court should then review the

trial court's decision about the motion in the same light that it
reviews any jury verdict.
(Wilkins, J., concurring).

See State v. Myers, 606 P.2d 250, 253
If the jury verdict withstands this

Court's scrutiny under the usual standard of review, the trial
court's decision not to arrest judgment on that verdict is not an
abuse of discretion.
Appellate courts accord great deference to a jury
verdict.

It is the exclusive function of the jury to weigh the

evidence and determine the credibility of the witnesses.

The

"Court should only interfere when . . . reasonable men could not
possibly have reached a verdict beyond a reasonable doubt."
State v. Lammf 606 P.2d 229, 231 (Utah 1980).

Furthermore,

defendant has the burden of establishing "that the evidence was
so inconclusive or insubstantial that reasonable minds must have
entertained a reasonable doubt that the defendant committed the

crime."

State v, Kerekes, 622 P.2d 1161, 1168 (Utah 1980).

See

also State v. Verde, 770 P.2d 116, 124 (Utah 1989).
Intent must often be inferred from surrounding
circumstances.

State v. Murphy, 674 P.2d 1220, 1223 (Utah 1983).

The jury could and did properly infer defendant's intent to kill
the child from the evidence presented to it.
Although the medical examiner could not determine a
specific cause of death due to the decomposition of the body, he
did determine that the manner of death was homicide (R. 1354 at
788-90).

This opinion was based upon the manner in which the

body was disposed of.
Finding a
rocks, in
that this
that this
found.

The examiner said:

body, bound and weighted with
a river, does not indicate to me
was a natural death; [it indicated]
was a body somebody wanted never

(R. 1354 at 788). In addition to this, there was the evidence of
defendant's jealousy of the child, and evidence that defendant
had abused the child.

Victoria DeLeon testified at length that

defendant had taken the newborn into a cold garage and later had
given the child a bath in cold water (R. 1351 at 312-13 and 31011).

Another time, defendant left the baby with a heating pad

turned up too high (R. 1352 at 355).

Still another time, when

defendant told Victoria that the baby had fallen from the car
seat, he became angry when she was upset and crying (R. 1351 at
314).

Defendant told Victoria that she worried too much about

the baby; that she cared more for the baby than she did about
defendant (R. 1351 at 315-16).

When defendant was tending the

child, it developed red marks on its lip, ribcage and neck which

were indicative of being struck or squeezed (R. 1351 at 317-19).
The baby had a bruise on its knee and, at another time, a bruise
between its eyes (R. 1351 at 320-21).

Again, defendant expressed

jealousy when Victoria cared for the child before responding to
defendant (R. 1351 at 321-22).

Several times the baby cried

excessively and defendant became angry at that (R. 1351 at 334
and R. 1352 at 353-54).

The jury also heard evidence that

defendant was unemployed and that money was tight for the family
(R. 1351 at 332-34 and R. 1352 at 389). Defendant admitted that
he became frustrated at the financial situation they found
themselves in after the baby's birth (R. 1355 at 1042-48).
The jury also had evidence of the elaborate ruse
defendant set up and carried on for three months about the child
having been kidnapped.

Defendant's credibility became even more

suspect when he testified that someone had broken into his
apartment the day of the child's disappearance.

Defendant

implied that whoever broke into the apartment may have taken the
drop cloth which was later found with the child's body wrapped in
it (R. 1356 at 1097).

On cross-examination, defendant admitted

that he had known for some time that it was the police who had
entered his apartment through a window the day of the
disappearance (R. 1356 at 1101).

There was also evidence that

defendant was cold and calculating in his displays of emotion
between the time the child disappeared and its body was found (R.
1357 at 1307-1309).

Finally, there was the testimony of Ronald

Peterson that he had shared a cell with defendant and others and
had overheard defendant tell another that defendant had killed

the child.

Defendant told the other inmate that defendant had

been to the area where the body was found the day before the
child disappeared (R. 1355 at 923).
From all of this evidence, the jury could reasonably
draw the inference that defendant intentionally or knowingly
killed his child.

The evidence is not so inconclusive or

insubstantial that reasonable minds could not have found
defendant guilty beyond a reasonable doubt. See State v. Lamm/
606 P.2d 229, 231 (Utah 1980); State v. Kerekes, 622 P.2d 1161,
1168 (Utah 1980); State v. Verde, 770 P.2d 116, 124 (Utah 1989).
Defendant asks this Court to reduce his conviction to
either negligent homicide, Utah Code Ann. § 76-5-206 (1990), or
manslaughter, Utah Code Ann. § 76-5-205 (1990) (Br. of App. at
33).

Defendant fails to inform this Court how the evidence

supports a finding that the homicide occurred due to criminal
negligence, recklessness, or extreme emotional disturbance.
Because defendant fails to provide legal or factual analysis,
this Court should decline to address this issue.
Amicone, 689 P.2d 1341 (Utah 1984).

State v.

In any event, the evidence,

as noted earlier in this point, supports the jury's determination
that defendant acted with intent or knowledge when he killed his
child.

Consequently, this Court should not reduce the degree of

defendant's conviction.
B.

Motion for Sentence Under Next Lower Category.

Defendant's sentence was within the limits prescribed
by law.

Utah Code Ann. §§ 76-5-202(2) and 76-3-206 (1990).

It

was not an abuse of discretion for the trial court to deny the

motion for sentencing under the next lower category on the
claimed basis that intent or knowledge had not been proven.
Sufficiency of evidence is not a basis for entering a conviction
of a lower category of offense.

The provision under which the

court could enter such a conviction reads:
If the court, having regard to the nature
and circumstances of the offense of which the
defendant was found guilty and to the history
and character of the defendant, concludes
that it would be unduly harsh to record the
conviction as being for that category of
offense established by statute and to
sentence the defendant to an alternative
normally applicable to that offense, the
court may . . . enter a judgment of
conviction for the next lower category of
offense and impose sentence accordingly.
Utah Code Ann. § 76-3-402(1) (1990).

Nothing in this statute

provides that the court can reduce the conviction if the court
feels that an element of the crime has not been proven beyond a
reasonable doubt.

This provision applies to the circumstances of

the offense and history of defendant, not to the sufficiency of
the evidence to convict.
Even if this provision were applicable to sufficiency
arguments, the trial court correctly denied the motion.

As

argued in subpoint A, the jury found that defendant had the
requisite mental state to convict him of first degree murder.
There was nothing so inconclusive or insubstantial about the
evidence to cause the trial court to doubt the jury's finding and
to sentence defendant to a lesser category.

POINT IV
DEFENDANT DID NOT PRESERVE HIS CLAIM OF ERROR
REGARDING ACCESS TO COUNSEL DURING TRIAL.
Defendant complains that he was denied access to his
counsel during the time he was housed in the Salt Lake County
Jail during trial. Again, in order to preserve this issue for
appellate review, defendant must have raised it in the trial
court.

This Court has said;
First, as we have repeatedly stated, "A
general rule of appellate review in criminal
cases in Utah is that a contemporaneous
objection or some form of specific
preservation of claims of error must be made
a part of the trial court record before an
appellate court will review such claim on
appeal." Importantly, the grounds for the
objection must be distinctly and specifically
stated.

State v. Johnson, 774 P.2d 1141, 1144 (Utah 1989) (quoting State
v. Tillman, 750 P.2d 546, 551 (Utah 1987)) (emphasis in original)
(footnote omitted).

It is also defendant's obligation to provide

an adequate record for this Court to review the alleged errors.
In State v. Linden, 761 P.2d 1386 (Utah 1988), this Court stated:
When a defendant predicates error to this
Court, he has the duty and responsibility
of supporting such allegation by an
adequate record. Absent that record,
defendant's assignment of error stands as
a unilateral allegation which the review
court has no power to determine. This
Court simply cannot rule on a question
which depends for its existence upon
alleged facts unsupported by the record.
Inasmuch as defendant has failed to provide
an adequate record on appeal on this point,
this Court presumes regularity in the
proceedings below. State v. Robbins, 709
P.2d 771, 773 (Utah 1985).

Id. at 1388 (quoting State v. Wulffenstein, 657 P.2d 289, 293
(Utah 1982), cert, denied, 460 U.S. 1044 (1983)).
In support of his claim that he was denied access to
his attorneys, defendant provides only one record citation.

A

review of the record demonstrates that defendant either did not
inform the trial court during the pendency of the trial that he
was not being allowed access to his attorneys, or did not make a
record about the problem during the time that he was being denied
access.

Because defendant had received a change of venue, his

trial was conducted in Salt Lake County; he was housed in the
Salt Lake County Jail during trial (PT. at 2-3).
The trial commenced on May 1, 1989 with selection of
the jury.

Nothing in the first volume of the trial transcript

indicates that defendant or his counsel addressed the court about
a problem with communication or access to defendant at the Salt
Lake County Jail (R. 1350).

The transcript of the second day of

trial does not record any communication from defendant or his
counsel about a problem with communication or access (R. 1351).
The only time the record mentions a "lack of access" is at the
conclusion of the trial, after the jury had retired to
deliberate.

At that time, defense counsel objected to certain

jury instructions issues, then said:
Also want [sic] to note for the record the
defendant's objection to the lack of access
to counsel during phases of the trial in Salt
Lake County, his inability of counsel to meet
with him in Salt Lake County because of
restrictions and procedures imposed by the
county jail. Therefore, he is denied
effective assistance of counsel as a result
of the denial.

(R. 1357 at 1374)•

If defendant ever raised the issue to the

trial court before the jury retired to deliberate, he failed to
raise it on the record•
Defendant either failed to object to the alleged lack
of access or failed to make a record of his objection.

In eithe

instance, he has failed to provide this Court with a record to
support his claim.

This Court then presumes regularity in the

proceedings below.

State v. Robbins, 709 P.2d 771, 773 (Utah

1985).
POINT V
THE TRIAL COURT DID NOT ERR IN REJECTING
CERTAIN OF DEFENDANT'S PROPOSED JURY
INSTRUCTIONS.
Defendant next claims error in the trial court's
refusal to submit two of his proposed jury instructions to the
jury.

Those instruction both deal with the concept of reasonable
4
alternative hypothesis (R. at 964-65 and 975). Defendant placed
his objections to the exclusion of these two instructions on the
record after the jury was instructed and had retired to
deliberate (R. 1357 at 1372-73).

The record does not disclose

the trial court's rejection of, or reason for rejecting, the
proposed instructions.

Since defendant has failed to provide a

record as to the court's reason for rejecting the instructions,
this Court could decline to further address the issue.
Linden, 761 P.2d 1386, 1388 (Utah 1988).

State v.

Even if the Court does

review the issue, defendant's claim is without merit.
4
Only one paragraph was omitted from defendant's proposed
instruction at page 964 of the record. Defendant challenges only
the omission of that paragraph in that instruction.

While some aspects of jury instructions are within the
discretion of the trial court, State v. Standiford/ 769 P.2d 254,
266 (Utah 1988) ("framing of instructions lies in the trial
judge's discretion"), "[t]he trial court has a duty to instruct
the jury on the law applicable to the facts of the case."
v. Potter, 627 P.2d 75, 78 (Utah 1981).

State

Because the record does

not demonstrate the reason that the court rejected the proposed
instructions, it is unclear whether the rejection was a
discretionary matter or a legal conclusion.

Discretionary

matters are reviewed under an abuse of discretion standard.
Goddard v. Hickman, 685 P.2d 530, 534-35 (Utah 1984).
conclusions are reviewed for correctness.

Legal

City of Monticello v.

Christensen, 788 P.2d 513, 516 (Utah), cert, denied, 111 S.Ct.
120 (1990).
"Instructions generally ought to be drafted with a view
to assisting the jury to understand the issues they have to
decide."

Standiford, 769 P.2d at 266.

Included in the duty to

instruct on the law applicable to the facts of the case is "the
right of the defendant to have his theory of the case presented
to the jury in a clear and understandable way."
at 78 (footnote omitted).

Potter, 627 P.2d

The trial court is not obligated to

give a requested instruction unless the instruction accurately
states the law.
359 (1972).

State v. Wilcox, 28 Utah 2d 71, 498 P.2d 357,

Also, M[i]t is not error to refuse a proposed

instruction if the point is properly covered in the other
instructions."

State v. Sessions, 645 P.2d 643, 647 (Utah 1982)

(citations omitted).
(Utah 1986).

See also State v. Miller, 727 P.2d 203, 206

The instruction issue presented in this case was
addressed by this Court in State v. Parsons, 781 P.2d 1275 (Utah
1989).

Parsons argued "that the trial court erred in refusing to

instruct the jury on the 'two reasonable hypotheses' theory• "
Id. at 1285.

Citing an earlier case, this Court stated:

In Larocco, we held, "An instruction on
reasonable alternative hypothesis is not
required, even when the evidence is solely
circumstantial." . . . Thus, choosing not to
give the instruction is squarely within the
discretion of the court.

The prosecution's burden of proof in any
criminal case, whether the evidence be direct
or circumstantial, or a combination of both,
is that of beyond a reasonable doubt. The
use of the reasonable alternative hypothesis
instruction is merely one way of expressing
that necessary burden of proof and there is
no apparent reason to mandate that one, and
only one, particular instruction be used by
trial judges in conveying to the jury the
meaning of that elusive phrase, "proof beyond
a reasonable doubt." . . . In any event, the
"reasonable doubt" instruction given in the
instant case clearly and appropriately
informed the jury of the legal standard to be
applied.
Id. at 1285-86 (quoting State v. Larocco, 665 P.2d 1272, 1273
(Utah 1983)) (emphasis in original) (other citation omitted).
The trial court gave legally sufficient instructions
regarding the presumption of innocence (R. at 1015), the
prosecution's burden of proof (R. at 1016-17), the definition of
direct and circumstantial evidence (R. at 1018), and the
5
reconciliation of conflicting evidence (R. at 1019).
These
instructions properly advised the jury of the legal standards to
Copies of these instructions are attached as Addendum A.

be applied.

The trial court did not abuse its discretion by

rejecting defendant's proposed "reasonable alternative
hypothesisM instructions.
POINT VI
THE TRIAL COURT DID NOT ABUSE ITS DISCRETION
BY DENYING DEFENDANT'S MOTION FOR NEW TRIAL.
Defendant's final claim is that the trial court erred
in denying his motions for new trial.

On May 26, 1989, defendant

filed a motion for new trial, alleging, inter alia, that a
witness was found who would testify about the position of the
door lock on defendant's car when it is in a locked position
at 1240-46).

(R.

After a hearing on this motion (Transcript of

hearing July 26, 1989 [hereafter T. 7/26/89]), the court denied
it (R. at 1326-31; a copy of the court's order, findings of fact,
and conclusions of law are attached as Addendum B).

The trial

court's file does not contain any other motion for new trial;
however, another one obviously was filed after the matter was
transmitted on appeal.

The transcript of the proceedings on the

second motion is included in the record as a supplemental
transcript of hearings conducted April 5 and 17, 1990 (Transcript
of hearings April 5, 1990 [hereafter T. 4/5/90], and April 17,
1990 [hereafter T. 4/17/90]).

This last motion for new trial was

based on defendant's allegation that he had discovered an inmate
Defendant also alleged that the verdict was improper because
one juror did not believe that defendant had intentionally or
knowingly killed his baby. Defendant does not raise that point
on appeal and, consequently, has abandoned it. An amended motion
for new trial, filed May 30, 1989, and challenging the authority
of the prosecutors to act in their office, has also not been
raised on appeal and thus should be considered abandoned. (R. at
1252-53).

at the prison who was willing to testify that Ron Peterson, a
State's witness, had testified falsely at trial (T. 4/5/90 at 2).
H

[T]he decision to grant or deny a new trial is a

matter of discretion with the trial court and will not be
reversed absent a clear abuse of that discretion."
Williams, 712 P.2d 220, 222 (Utah 1985).

State v.

In order to "constitute

a ground for a new trial, newly discovered evidence must meet the
following criteria:
(1) It must be such as could not with
reasonable diligence have been discovered and
produced at the trial; (2) it must not be
merely cumulative; (3) it must be such as to
render a different result probable on the
retrial of the case."
State v. Conrad, 590 P.2d 1264, 1266 (Utah 1979) (quoting State
v. Gellatly, 22 Utah 2d 149, 449 P.2d 993 (1969)).

"Generally,

newly discovered impeachment evidence does not ordinarily warrant
a new trial."

State v. Worthen, 765 P.2d 839, 851 (Utah 1988)

(citations omitted).

The evidence defendant now claims as basis

for a new trial could have been discovered before trial, is
cumulative, is impeachment evidence, and is not likely to render
a different result on retrial.
In reference to the evidence of the door lock, the
trial court found that that evidence was discoverable before
trial and was not critical to the jury's verdict (R. at 1328 and
T. 7/26/89 at 10-11).

Defendant did not call any witnesses at

the hearing on his first motion for new trial, relying instead on
affidavits and his restatement of the material presented in the
affidavits (R. at 1287-96 and 1301-1303 and T. 7/26/89 at 2-5).
Those affidavits indicate that defendant told his counsel during

trial that an examination of the car from which defendant claims
his child was taken would show that the photograph which was
Exhibit 66 showed the driver's door lock in an unlocked position
(R. at 1288).

Attempts to locate the car, which had been sold

after defendant's arrest, were unavailing until after trial (R.
at 1289).
The court did not abuse its discretion in determining
that defendant could have obtained this information before trial
and that it was not critical to the jury's verdict.

A search for

the car could have been conducted before trial; the information
was not difficult to obtain and did not take an inordinate amount
of time to obtain (R. at 1288-89).

Whether the door was locked

or unlocked is not an issue which would probably affect the
result if this matter were to be retried.

The State's theory is

that the child was not in the car when defendant went in to Osco
Drug; it is immaterial to defendant's conviction whether he left
the door locked or unlocked.

Even given defendant's claim that

the baby was taken from the car, the position of the door lock is
insignificant in the face of the overwhelming circumstantial
evidence supporting defendant's conviction.
Even though the court did not address the issue of the
cumulative nature of this testimony in his ruling, this Court may
affirm the trial court's decision on this separate ground.

State

v. Bryan, 709 P.2d 157, 160 (Utah 1985) (appellate court "may
affirm on any proper grounds, even though the trial court
assigned another reason for its ruling").

Defendant testified

that Exhibit 66 showed the door in an unlocked position (R. 1355

at 1056).

The evidence proffered in the affidavits in support of

the motion for new trial was merely cumulative.

The proffered

evidence also was contradicted by the testimony of Marthan
Ferguson, who saw a blonde girl walk to defendant's car and try
to open the driver's door (R. 1353 at 597).
To the extent that defendant offered the door lock
evidence to impeach the testimony of a police officer (Br. of
App. at 50), impeachment evidence is not proper grounds for
granting a new trial.

The issue of the car door lock does not

support a new trial because it is cumulative, offered for
impeachment, and does not raise the likelihood of a different
result on retrial.
No motion, written order, findings, or conclusions
appear in the record for defendant's second motion for new trial.
Defendant apparently based that motion on allegations that
Kenneth Lisner, an inmate at the prison, had approached defendant
and told defendant that Ron Peterson had admitted lying at
defendant's trial (T. 4/5/90 at 2 and 5). That evidence was
offered as impeachment of Peterson's testimony (T. 4/5/90 at 6).
The hearing then turned to a discussion of defendant's failure to
call as a witness Jon Lippencott, the person Peterson testified
defendant told about having killed his child (T. 4/5/90 at 1433).

Rather than continue to argue the statement of Lisner about

Peterson's alleged statement to Lisner, defendant asked the court
to continue the matter.

The continuance was sought to allow

defendant to procure the attendance of Lippencott in order to
refute Peterson's testimony.
(T. 4/5/90 at 33-34).

The motion to continue was granted

Defendant was unable to secure Lippencott's attendance
when the court recalled the matter on April 17, 1989.

Neither

was defendant able to assure the court that Lippencott would
appear if the matter was further continued.

The motion for

further continuance was denied (T. 4/17/90 at 2-3 and 13-14).
The court then entered verbal findings and conclusions in denying
defendant's second motion for new trial (T. 4/17/90 at 15-16).
The court determined that the evidence had been available to
7
defendant prior to trial (T. 4/17/90 at 15). Second, the court
determined that the proffered evidence would be cumulative; "that
it would result in nothing more than a push and pull match
between prisoners. . . . And that verbal tug-of-war could endure
indefinitely" (T. 4/17/90 at 15).
Finally, the court concluded that the proffered
evidence would not result in a different result on retrial.

The

court said:
The defendant, in the Court's opinion, was
not convicted on the testimony of Ronald
Peterson. The defendant was convicted on an
exceptionally strong circumstantial evidence
case. Historically, circumstantial evidence
has been as persuasive as direct evidence.
The Court heard the testimony day after day
after day, regarding the allegations against
the defendant. The Court finds that the
tests for newly discovered evidence relating
to a new trial do not exist. Even if they
did exist, the Court agrees totally and
completely with the jury verdict rendered in
this case, and is absolutely of the opinion
that the outcome of this case would have not
been any different whether Ron Peterson
testified or not. For that, all of those
reasons, and all of those findings, the Court
The record does not indicate whether the evidence the court
was referring to was the testimony of Lippencott or of Lisner.

denies the defendant's motion for a new
trial.
(T. 4/17/90 at 16).

Defendant has not demonstrated to this Court

that the trial court's decision was an abuse of discretion.
CONCLUSION
Based on the foregoing, the State respectfully requests
that this Court affirm defendant's conviction.
J
RESPECTFULLY submitted this JZday of January, 1991.
R. PAUL VAN DAM
Attorney General

CHARLENE BARLOW
Assistant Attorney General
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INSTRUCTION NO.

All
favor

presumptions

of
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of law, independent
and a defendant

is

proved guilty beyond a reasonable doubt.

of evidence,
innocent

until

are in
he is

You are Instructed that

the State has the burden of proving the defendant guilty beyond a
reasonable doubt, and in case of a reasonable doubt as to whether
his

guilt

acquittal.

is

satisfactorily

shown,

he

is

entitled

to

an

INSTRUCTION N O .

|Q«

A person charged with a crime is presumed to be innocent
until he/she is proven guilty beyond a reasonable doubt.

The

presumption of innocence is not a mere form to be disregarded by the
jury at pleasure, but is a substantial/ essential part of the law
and is binding upon the jury.

This presumption is a humane

provision of the law, intended, so far as human agency is capable,
to guard against the danger of an innocent person being unjustly
punished*
The presumption of innocence must continue to prevail in
the minds of the jury unless and until the jury is satisfied beyond
a reasonable doubt of the guilt of the defendant.

And in case of a

reasonable doubt as to the defendant's guilt he/she is entitled to
an acquittal.
I have heretofore told you that the burden is upon the
State to prove the defendant guilty beyond a reasonable doubt.

Mow,

by reasonable doubt is meant a doubt that is based on reason and one
which is reasonable in view of all the evidence.

Proof beyond a

reasonable doubt is that degree of proof which satisfies the mind
and convinces the understanding of those who are bound to act
conscientiously upon it.

A reasonable doubt is a doubt which

reasonable men and women would entertain, and it must arise from the
evidence or the lack of evidence in this case.

It

after

an

impartial

con. iuo r a t 1on

<%*%<! c o m p a c l i u n

ot

« n

the e v i d e n c e i n the c a s e you can c a n d i d l y say t h a t you are not

s a t i s f i e d of the d e f e n d a n t s g u i l t , you have a reasonable doubt.
But i f a f t e r such impartial c o n s i d e r a t i o n and comparison of
a l l the evidence you can truthfully say that you have an abiding
c o n v i c t i o n of the defendant's g u i l t such as you w i l l be w i l l i n g to
act upon in the m-e-f-e weighty and important matters relating to your
own a f f a i r s , you have no reasonable doubt.

A reasonable doubt must

be a r e a l , s u b s t a n t i a l doubt and not one that i s merely possible or
imaginary.

-

2 -

INSTRUCTION NO* 11-
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a verdict.
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testimony

other

shows any act, statement
fact,

person's

of the testimony
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part
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trial
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reasonable
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or
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INSTRUCTION NO.

Where there Is a conflict

12.

In the evidence you should

reconcile such conflict as far as you reasonably can.

But where

the conflict cannot be reconciled, you are the final Judges and
must determine from the evidence what the facts are.

There are

no definite rules governing how you shall determine the weight or
convincing force of any evidence, or how you shall determine what
the facts In this case are.

But you should carefully and

conscientiously consider and compare all of the testimony, and
all of the facts and circumstances, which have a bearing on any
issue, and determine therefrom what the facts are.

You are not

bound to believe all that the witnesses have testified to or any
witness or class of witnesses unless such testimony is reasonable
and convincing
evidence.

In view of all of the facts and circumstances In

You may believe one witness as against many, or many

as against a fewer number
convictions.

In accordance with your honest

The testimony of a witness known to have made false

statements on one matter is naturally less convincing on other
matters.

So If you believe a wltnoss has willfully

falsely as to any material

testified

fact in this case, you may disregard

the whole of the testimony of such witness, or you may give It
such weight as you think It is entitled to.
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ADDENDUM B

IN THE THIRD JUDICIAL DISTRICT COURT
SALT LAKE COUNTY, STATE OF UTAH

MINUTE ENTRY
STATE OF UTAH
PLAINTIFF
VS
JAMES, STEVEN RAY

CASE NUMBER 891900667 FS
DATE 07/26/89
HONORABLE PAT B BRIAN
COURT REPORTER BRAD YOUNG
COURT CLERK EHM

DEFENDANT
TYPE OF HEARING:
MOTION HEARING
PRESENT: PLAINTIFF DEFENDANT
P. ATTY. JENKINS, JAMES
D. ATTY. GUTKE, ROBERT WW

THIS MATTER COMES NOW BEFORE THE COURT FOR A HEARING ON
DEFENDANTS MOTION FOR A NEW TRIAL. THE MOTION IS ARGUED AND
SUBMITTED. THE COURT RULES AS FOLLOWS:
THE MOTION THAT NEW TRIAL BE GRANTED BECAUSE CRITICAL
EVIDENCE HAD NOT BEEN PRESENTED IS DENIED.
THE MOTION THAT NEW TRIAL BE GRANTED BECAUSE THE COUNTY
ATTORNEY HAD BEEN IMPROPERLY APPOINTED OR SWORN IN IS
DENIED.
THE MOTION THAT A NEW TRIAL BE GRANTED BECAUSE A JUROR
ALLEDGED DOUBT IS DENIED.
THE COURT RULES THAT A SETTLEMENT TRY TO BE REACHED THROUGH
PROPER COUNTY CHANNELS ON THE MOTION THAT FUNDS BE PROVIDED FOR
EXPERT ASSISTANCE.

AUG
James C. Jenkins
Deputy Cache County Attorney
110 North 100 West
Logan, Utah 84321
(801) 752-8920
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IN THE THIRD JUDICIAL DISTRICT COURT
COUNTY OF SALT LAKE, STATE OF UTAH
THE STATE OF UTAH,

)

Plaintiff,

)

FINDINGS OF FACT AND
CONCLUSIONS OF LAW
CONCERNING DEFENDANT'S
MOTION FOR NEW TRIAL

)

Case No. 891900667

)

vs.
STEVEN RAY JAMES,
Defendant.

This matter having come before the Court on

Defendant's

Motion for New Trial and the Court having reviewed the pleadings
herein submitted by the parties and after a hearing before this
Court on July 26, 1989 at 10:00 a.m. wherein the defendant was
personally present and represented by counsel and the State was
present and represented

by counsel and

the Court having been

fully advised in the premises; now therefore the Court makes the
following:
FINDINGS OF FACT AND CONCLUSIONS OF LAW
1.

Defendant has sought a new trial on three grounds.

Each

will be separately addressed herein.
2.
newly

With respect to the first ground, that being a claim of
discovered

evidence

concerning

the position of the

defendant's door lock, such does not justify a motion
trial.

The Court specifically finds that the allegations

for new

concerning whether the door lock was in a locked position was
discoverable before trial, and furthermore, whether or not the
door was in a locked position is not critical to the jury's
verdict*

As a matter of law, the standard by which a new trial

is granted requires that the alleged new evidence must have a
substantial adverse effect on the rights of a party warranting a
new trial.

The Court was present throughout the entire trial

proceedings, heard all of the evidence presented to the jury, and
this Court finds that a determination of whether the door lock
was in a locked or unlocked position at the time in question does
not have a substantial adverse effect on the rights of the
defendant.

Therefore, the motion for a new trial should be

denied.
3.

The second

basis for a new trial alleged by the

defendant is that the verdict does not represent the finding of
the trial juror Valerie McCoy.

The Court finds that the

allegations on this issue asserted by the defendant are not a
justifiable basis for a new trial.

The Affidavit of Ms. Barton-

Coombs is inadmissable under the law and therefore cannot be
received

as a basis for consideration.

Additionally, the

affidavit submitted by the subject juror is clearly contrary to
the allegations of the defendant.
entered

The Court finds that the jury

its verdict properly, that at the request of the

defendant each juror was personally polled as to whether the
verdict represented each juror's finding in the case, and the

-2-

subject juror specifically stated in open Court that the verdict
was her verdict.

The Court further finds that as a matter of law

under Rule 606(b) of the Utah Rules of Evidence and the case law
as articulated in State v. Couch, 635 P. 2d 89 (Utah 1981) a new
trial should not be granted under the circumstances asserted by
the defendant.
4.

A new trial therefore should be denied.

With respect to the final claim of defendant for new

trial, that being the allegation that the prosecuting attorneys
were not lawfully entitled to prosecute the matter, this Court
finds that such is not a basis for a new trial.

The Court

specifically finds that the objection to the legal status of the
prosecuting attorneys was not timely raised.

Furthermore, this

Court finds that from the evidence presented, the prosecuting
attorneys were properly appointed and acting in their official
capacity at the time of trial, and specifically finds that Mr.
Jenkins, who was lead counsel for the State was appointed and
took office as Deputy County Attorney of Cache County on October
2, 1982, and that Mr. Burbank was appointed and took the oath of
office on September 20, 1983.

The Court further finds that as a

matter of law that defendant's allegations with respect to the
authority of the prosecutor does not justify a new trial.
Therefore, a new trial should not be granted.
DATED this

7

day of August, 1989.

PAT B. BRIAN
District Judge

W/^-
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AUG
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James C. Jenkins
Deputy Cache County Attorney
110 North 100 West
Logan, Utah 84321
(801) 752-8920

DapiiV Clark

IN THE THIRD JUDICIAL DISTRICT COURT
COUNTY OF SALT LAKE, STATE OF UTAH
THE STATE OF UTAH,
Plaintiff,

]
1

ORDER DENYING DEFENDANT'S
MOTION FOR MEW TRIAL

vs.
Case No. 891900667
STEVEN RAY JAMES,
Defendant.

'

This matter having come before the Court on Defendant's
Motion and Amended Motion for a Nev; Trial and the Court having
reviewed the pleadings herein and the evidence submitted and
having heard the arguments of counsel at a hearing held July 26,
1989 at 10:00 a.m. before the above entitled Court, and the Court
further having entered its Findings of Fact and Conclusions of
Law, now therefore;
IT IS HEREBY ORDERED that Defendant's Motion for a New Trial
be and the same hereby is denied.
DATED this

^

day of August, 1989.
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